We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a payoff function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the the payoff function is both shift-invariant and submixing, then the game is half-positional, i.e. the first player has an optimal strategy which is both deterministic and stationary. This result relies on the existence of ǫ-subgame-perfect equilibria in shiftinvariant games, a second contribution of the paper.
I. INTRODUCTION.
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with finitely many states S and actions A, perfect information and infinite duration. Each state is controlled by either Player 1 or Player 2. A play of the game is an infinite sequence of steps: at each step the game is in some state s ∈ S and the player who controls this state chooses an action, which determines a lottery that is used to randomly choose the next state. Players have full knowledge about the rules of the game (the states and actions sets, who controls which state and the lotteries associated to pairs of states and actions) and when they choose an action they have full knowledge of the actions played and the states visited so far.
Each player wants to maximize his expected payoff, and the game is zero-sum. The payoff of player 1 (which is exactly the loss of Player 2) associated with an infinite play s 0 a 1 s 1 · · · ∈ (SA) ω is computed by a measurable and bounded payoff function f : (SA) ω → R.
Well-known examples of payoff functions are the discounted payoff function, the mean-payoff function, the limsup payoff function and the parity payoff function. These four classes of games share a common property: in these games both players have optimal strategies and moreover these strategies can be chosen to be both deterministic and stationary: such strategies guarantee a maximal expected payoff and choose actions deterministically and this choice only depends on the current state. When deterministic and stationary optimal strategies exist for player 1 in any game equipped with f , we say f is halfpositional, and we say f is positional if such strategies exist for both players.
There has been numerous papers about the existence of deterministic and stationary optimal strategies in games with different payoff functions. Shapley proved that stochastic games with discounted payoff function are positional using an operator approach [1] . Derman showed the positionality of one-player games with expected mean-payoff reward, using an Abelian theorem and a reduction to discounted games [2] . His results was later on extended to two-player games by Bierth [3] , see also [4] for a modern proof. Gilette extended Derman result to two-players games [5] but his proof was found wrong and corrected by Ligget and Lippman [6] . Note that the authors of the present paper are not convinced by the proof of Liggett and Lippman, we discuss this in Section VI-A. The positionality of one-player parity games was addressed in [7] and later on extended to two-player games in [8] , [9] . Counter games were extensively studied in [10] and several examples of positional counter games are given. There are also several examples of one-player and two-player positional games in [11] , [12] . A whole zoology of half-positional games is presented in [13] and another example is given by meanpayoff co-Büchi games [14] . The proofs of these various results are mostly ad-hoc and very heterogeneous.
Some research has been made to find a common property of these games which explains why they are positional or halfpositional. It appears that shift-invariant and submixing payoff functions play a central role. For one-player games it was proved by the first author that every one-player game equipped with such a payoff function is positional [11] . This result was successfully used in [10] to prove positionality of counter games. A weaker form of this condition was presented in [15] to prove positionality of deterministic games (i.e. games where transition probabilities are equal to 0 or 1). Kopczynski proved that two-player deterministic games equipped with a shiftinvariant and submixing which takes only two values is halfpositional [16] .
The present paper provides two contributions. First, in games whose payoff function is shift-invariant, both players have ǫ-subgame-perfect strategies, i.e. strategies that are ǫ-optimal not only when the game starts but also whatever finite play has already been played (Theorem IV.1).
Second, every two-player game equipped with a shiftinvariant and submixing payoff function is half-positional., i.e. Player 1 has an optimal strategy which is both deterministic and stationary (Theorem IV.1).
The paper starts with preliminaries then in Section III we provide several examples of payoff functions, in Section IV we state and prove the existence of ǫ-subgame-perfect strategies in shift-invariant games, in Section V we state and prove that games with shift-invariant and submixing payoff functions are half-positional and finally in Section VI we present some applications. Proofs that are not provided in the paper can be found in the appendix.
II. STOCHASTIC GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION.
In this section, we present the notion of stochastic games with perfect information, of the value of such games and of determinacy of a game as well as several results about martingales that are used in the next section.
A. Games
A game is specified by the arena and the payoff function. While the arena determines how the game is played, the payoff function specifies what for the players play.
We use the following notations throughout the paper. Let S be a finite set. The set of finite (resp. infinite) sequences on S is denoted S * (resp. S ω ) and S ∞ = S * ∪S ω . If S is an infinite set then S ω denotes the set of infinite sequences u ∈ S N such that u ∈ S N 0 for some finite subset S 0 ⊆ S. A probability distribution on S is a function δ : S → R such that ∀s ∈ S, 0 ≤ δ(s) ≤ 1 and s∈S δ(s) = 1. The set of probability distributions on S is denoted ∆(S).
Definition II.1 (Arenas).
A stochastic arena with perfect information A = (S, S 1 , S 2 , A, (A(s)) s∈S , p) is made of:
• a set of states S partitioned in two sets (S 1 , S 2 ), • a set of actions A, • for each state s ∈ S, a non-empty set A(s) ⊆ A of actions available in s, • and transition probabilities p : S × A → ∆(S) .
In the sequel, stochastic arenas with perfect information are simply called arenas and we only consider arenas with finitely many states and actions.
An infinite play in an arena A is an infinite sequence p = s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 · · · ∈ (SA) ω such that for every n ∈ N, a n+1 ∈ A(s n ). A finite play in A is a finite sequence in S(AS) * which is the prefix of an infinite play. The first state of a play is called its source, the last state of a finite play is called its target.
With each infinite play is associated a payoff computed by a payoff function. Player 1 prefers strategies that maximize the expected payoff while Player 2 has the exact opposite preference.
Formally, a payoff function for the arena A is a bounded and Borel-measurable function f : (SA) ω → R which associates with each infinite play h a payoff f (h). In the next section, we will present several examples of such functions.
Definition II.2 (Stochastic game with perfect information).
A stochastic game with perfect information is a pair G = (A, f ) where A is an arena and f a payoff function for the arena A.
B. Strategies
A strategy in an arena A for Player 1 is a function σ : (SA) * S 1 → ∆(A) such that for any finite play s 0 a 1 · · · s n , and every action a ∈ A, (σ(s 0 a 1 · · · s n )(a) > 0) =⇒ (a ∈ A(s n )). Strategies for player 2 are defined similarly and are often denoted τ .
We are especially interested in a very simple class of strategies: deterministic and stationary strategies. Definition II.3 (Deterministic and stationary strategies). A strategy σ for Player 1 is deterministic if for every finite play h ∈ (SA) * S 1 and action a ∈ A,
A strategy σ is stationary if σ(h) only depends on the target of h. In other words σ is stationary if for every state t ∈ S 1 and for every finite play h with target t,
In the definition of a stationary strategy, remark that t ∈ S denotes at the same time the target of the finite play h as well as the finite play t of length 1.
Given an initial state s ∈ S and strategies σ and τ for players 1 and 2 respectively, the set of infinite plays with source s is naturally equipped with a sigma-field and a probability measure denoted P σ,τ s that are defined as follows. Given a finite play h and an action a, the set of infinite plays h(AS) ω and ha(SA) ω are cylinders that we abusively denote h and ha. The sigma-field is the one generated by cylinders and P σ,τ s is the unique probability measure on the set of infinite plays with source s such that for every finite play h with target t, for every action a ∈ A and for every state r ∈ S,
For n ∈ N, we denote S n and A n the random variables defined by S n (s 0 a 1 s 1 · · · ) = s n and A n (s 0 a 1 s 1 · · · ) = a n .
C. Values and optimal strategies
Let G be a game with a bounded measurable payoff function f : (SA) ω → R. The expected payoff associated with an initial state s and two strategies σ and τ is the expected value of f under P σ,τ s , denoted E σ,τ s [f ]. The maxmin and minmax values of a state s ∈ S in the game G are:
By definition of maxmin and minmax, for every state s ∈ S, maxmin(G)(s) ≤ minmax(G)(s). As a corollary of the second Martins's determinacy theorem [17] , the converse inequality holds as well:
Theorem II.4 (Martin second determinacy theorem). Let G be a game with a Borel-measurable payoff function f . Then for every state s ∈ S:
This common value is called the value of state s in the game G and denoted val(G)(s).
the existence of a value guarantees the existence of ǫoptimal strategies for both players and every ǫ > 0.
Definition II.5 (optimal and ǫ-optimal strategies). Let G be a game, ǫ > 0 and σ a strategy for player 1. Then σ is ǫ-optimal if for every strategy τ and every state s ∈ S,
The definition for player 2 is symmetric. A 0-optimal strategy is simply called optimal.
The following proposition provides a link between the notion of optimal strategies and the notion of value.
Proposition II.6. Let G be a game and suppose that Player 1 has an optimal strategy σ ♯ . Then G has a value and for every state s ∈ S:
An even stronger class of strategy are ǫ-subgame-perfect strategies, i.e. strategies that are not only ǫ-optimal from the initial state s but stays also ǫ-optimal whatever the beginning of the play is.
Definition II.7 (ǫ-subgame-perfect strategies). Let G be a game equipped with a payoff function f and σ a strategy for player 1. For every finite play p = s 0 · · · s n we denote σ[p] the shift of strategy σ by p as the strategy defined by
Then σ is said to be ǫ-subgame-perfect if for every finite play p the strategy σ[p] is ǫ-optimal.
D. Martingales
In the proofs of Section IV we use the following classical results about martingales.
Definition II.8 (Martingale) . A sequence of real-valued random variables X 0 , X 1 , . . . is called a martingale if for every time n the following are satisfied:
In case of having ≤, or ≥ instead of the equality, then the process is called a supermartingale or submartingale respectively.
Martingales do converge almost-surely. Lemma II.9 (Doob's convergence theorem for martingales). Let X 0 , X 1 , . . . be a (sub)(super)martingale such that (E[|X n |]) n∈N is bounded. Then almost surely the limit X = lim n→∞ X n exists and is finite.
We use stopping times as well.
Definition II.10. A stopping time V with respect to a sequence of random variables S 0 , S 1 , . . . is a random variable that takes values from N ∪ {∞} such that the event V = n is
The following theorem is a variant of Doob's optional stopping theorem.
Theorem II.11. Let T be a stopping time with respect to a sequence of random variables S 0 , S 1 , . . . . Let (X n ) n∈N a martingale such that for every n ∈ N, X n is (S 0 , . . . , S n )measurable. Assume there exists K > 0 such that ∀n ∈ N, P(|X n | ≤ K) = 1. Let X T be the random variable defined by:
Then:
Similarly if the process is a submartingale or a supermartingale, and the same conditions hold we have
Note that the definition of X T makes sense thanks to Lemma II.9.
III. COMPUTING PAYOFFS
In this section, we present several examples of payoff functions and generalize the definition of a payoff function to cover these examples.
A. Examples
Among the most well-known examples of payoff functions, are the mean-payoff and the discounted payoff functions, used in economics, as well as the parity condition, used in logics and computer science, and the limsup payoff function, used in game theory.
The mean-payoff function has been introduced by Gilette [5] . Intuitively, it measures average performances. Each state s ∈ S is labeled with an immediate reward r(s) ∈ R. With an infinite play s 0 a 1 s 1 · · · is associated an infinite sequence of rewards r 0 = r(s 0 ), r 1 = r(s 1 ), . . . and the payoff is:
f mean (r 0 r 1 · · · ) = lim sup
The discounted payoff has been introduced by Shapley [1] . Intuitively, it measures long-term performances with an inflation rate: immediate rewards are discounted. Each state s is labeled not only with an immediate reward r(s) ∈ R but also with a discount factor 0 ≤ λ(s) < 1. With an infinite play h labeled with the sequence (r 0 , λ 0 )(r 1 , λ 1 ) · · · ∈ (R × [0, 1[) ω of daily payoffs and discount factors is associated the payoff:
The parity condition is used in automata theory and logics [18] . Each state s is labeled with some priority c(s) ∈ {0, . . . , d}. The payoff 1 if the highest priority seen infinitely often is odd, and 0 otherwise. For c 0 c 1 · · · ∈ {0, . . . , d} ω , f par (c 0 c 1 · · · ) = 0 if lim sup n c n is even, 1 otherwise.
The limsup payoff function has been used in the theory of gambling games [19] . States are labeled with immediate rewards and the payoff is the supremum limit of the rewards: f lsup (r 0 r 1 · · · ) = lim sup n r n .
One-counter stochastic games have been introduced in [10] , in these games each state s ∈ S is labeled by a relative integer from c(s) ∈ Z. Three different winning conditions were defined and studied in [10] :
Generalized mean payoff games were introduced in [20] . Each state is labeled by a fixed number of immediate rewards r (1) , . . . , r (k) , which define as many mean payoff conditions f 1 mean , . . . , f k mean . The winning condition is:
B. Payoff functions
In the four examples above, the way payoffs are computed is actually independent from the arena which is considered. To be able to consider a payoff function independently of the arenas equipped with this payoff function, we generalize the definition of payoff functions.
Definition III.1 (Payoff functions). A payoff function is any bounded and measurable function
is equipped with f if there exists a mapping r : S × A → C such that for every infinite play s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 · · · in the arena A, g(s 0 , a 1 , s 1 , a 2 , . . .) = f (r(s 0 , a 1 ), r(s 1 , a 2 ), . . .) .
In the case of the mean payoff and the limsup payoff functions, colours are real numbers and C ⊆ R, whereas in the case of the discounted payoff colours are pairs C ⊆ R × [0, 1[ and for the parity game colours are integers C = {0, . . . , d}.
Throughout this paper, we focuse on shift-invariant payoff functions.
Note that shift-invariance is a strictly stronger property than tail-measurability. Tail-measurability means that for every n ∈ N, the value of f (c 0 c 1 · · · ) is independent of the coordinates c 0 , . . . , c n . For example the function
is tail-measurable but not prefix-independent [21] . It seems to the authors of the present paper that the results of [22] hold for shift-invariant winning objectives but no proof is given under the weaker assumption of tail-measurability. Actually, tailmeasurability and shift-invariance are presented as equivalent in the preliminaries ( [22, l. 28 p. 184]) and the shift-invariance hypothesis is used in the core of the proof ( [22, l. -1 p.190]).
IV. ON THE EXISTENCE OF ǫ-SUBGAME-PERFECT

STRATEGIES
The following theorem is one of the two contributions of the paper, and is a cornerstone for the result of the next section.
The remainder of this section is devoted into proving this theorem. The proof is done from the point of view of Player 1, but it holds symmetrically for Player 2.
A. Weaknesses
For the remainder of Section IV fix ǫ > 0.
In order to talk about unwanted behavior in the quest of proving that there exists a strategy that is ǫ-subgame-perfect, we need the notion of a weakness.
Definition IV.2 (Weakness). Given a strategy σ for Player 1, a finite play p
When playing with strategy σ we say that a weakness occurs in an infinite play if some finite prefix of it is a σ-weakness. Remark that a strategy is 2ǫ-subgame-perfect if and only if no σ-weakness can occur when playing with σ.
Every infinite play q ∈ S(AS) ω can be factorized uniquely as a finite or infinite sequence of plays p 0 , p 1 , p 2 , . . . such that q = p 0 p 1 p 2 . . . , and for every p n , 1) if p n is finite then p n is a σ-weakness, 2) if p n is finite then no strict prefix of p n is a σ-weakness, 3) if p n is infinite then q = p 0 p 1 · · · p n and no prefix of p n is a σ-weakness, Having this factorization in mind helps understand better the results of this section. In the proofs we will rely upon the function δ, defined as follows.
Definition IV.3. Let σ be a strategy for Player 1, and s 0 . . . s n ∈ S(AS) * define inductively on n δ σ (s 0 . . . s n ) = n if p is a σ-weakness, δ σ (s 0 . . . s n−1 ) otherwise where p = s δσ (s0...sn−1) . . . s n , and δ σ (s 0 ) = 0. For n > 0, we say that a weakness occurs at date n if δ σ (s 0 . . . s n ) = n.
The function δ give the cutting dates of the factorization described before the lemma.
B. The reset strategy
Using the notion of a weakness above we define a strategy called the reset strategy, that resets the memory whenever a weakness occurs, and the sequel is devoted to proving that this strategy is subgame perfect.
Definition IV.4 (The reset strategy). Let σ be an ǫ-optimal strategy. We define the reset strategyσ based on σ as the strategy that resets the memory whenever a weakness occurs, that isσ
The construction of the reset strategy is an extension of the construction of the switching strategy in the proof of [22, Theorem 1] ; while at most one memory reset is performed by the switching strategy, the reset strategy may reset its memory infinitely often.
The reset strategy has been used in [23] to prove the existence of optimal strategies in games with perfect information and two-valued payoff functions. Note that this property does not hold in the general case, for example there are in general no optimal strategies in games colored by {0, 1} and equipped with the payoff function
C. Consistent ǫ-optimal strategies
We devote this subsection to proving that for every ǫ > 0 there are ǫ-optimal strategies that play consistently, that is they never play a suboptimal action.
1) Consistent strategies:
If a is not optimal it is said to be suboptimal.
Definition IV.6. A strategy is consistent if it plays only optimal actions.
An important property of games when both players play only optimal actions is that the stochastic process (val(S n )) n∈N is a martingale.
Theorem IV.7. Let σ and τ be strategies for player 1 and 2 and s ∈ S. Assume σ is consistent then (val(S n )) n∈N is a sub-martingale for the probability measure P σ,τ s . If both σ and τ are consistent then (val(S n )) n∈N is a martingale.
2) Both players play ultimately consistently: In this subsection we show that if Player 1 plays consistently then almost surely both players eventually will play only optimal actions.
We actually prove an even stronger fact: under the same hypothesis, both players eventually play only actions which do not change the value of the state. First we define such actions:
Definition IV.8 (Value-neutral actions). We call an action a ∈ A(s) value neutral if for all s ′ ∈ S we have:
Note that a value-neutral action is optimal, and a suboptimal action is not value-neutral.
Lemma IV.9. For every consistent strategy σ, strategy τ and s ∈ S, P σ,τ s (∃n ∈ N, ∀k ≥ n, A n is value-neutral ) = 1. The proof is based on Doob's lemma (LemmaII.9), which implies that when Player 1 plays consistently, (val(S n )) n∈N converges almost-surely, which is possible only when all actions played are ultimately value-neutral.
Since value-neutral actions are optimal, we get the it implies that when Player 1 plays consistently then suboptimal actions are played only finitely often.
Corollary IV.10. For every consistent strategy σ, strategy τ and s ∈ S, P σ,τ s (∃n ∈ N, ∀k ≥ n, A n is optimal ) = 1. 3) There are consistent ǫ-optimal strategies: It would simplify the proofs in the sequel if we knew that for every ǫ > 0 we can choose an ǫ-optimal strategy that plays consistently. In that way we know that Player 1 will never decrease his chances for a larger payoff on average. That is the purpose of the following lemma.
Lemma IV.11. In game G equipped with the payoff function f , let ǫ ′ > 0, and a ∈ A(s) a suboptimal action in state s ∈ S 1 . Then there exists an ǫ ′ -optimal strategy for Player 1 that never plays action a.
The proof associates with every strategy using a a better strategy that does not use a.
Corollary IV.12. In a game equipped with a shift-invariant function, for all ǫ ′ > 0 both players have ǫ ′ -optimal consistent strategies.
The proof is by induction on the number of non-optimal actions, using Lemma IV.11.
It is useful to see the first weakness after some date n as a stopping time and to see what we can say about the process (val(S n )) n∈N stopped at such a time, which is a consequence of Doob's optional stopping theorem (Theorem II.11).
Corollary IV.13. Let T be a stopping time with respect to (S n ) n∈N . Then for all consistent strategy σ, and all strategies τ and state s ∈ S, (val(S n )) n∈N converges almost-surely and
In case we assume τ consistent instead of σ the converse inequality holds.
Proof: Immediate from Theorem II.11, since in a consistent game (val(S n )) n∈N forms a martingale (Theorem IV.7), and from the hypothesis that the payoff function f is bounded, we have that the values are also bounded.
D. Only finitely many weaknesses occur when playingσ
The goal of this subsection is to show that when playing with the reset strategyσ (based on some ǫ-optimal strategy σ) the set of paths with infinitely many weaknesses have measure 0, or equivalently almost surely there exists a last weakness. We start by proving that when Player 2 plays consistently, the probability that no weakness occur is strictly positive.
Lemma IV.14. Let σ be an ǫ-optimal strategy, then there exists µ > 0 such that for all strategy τ and s ∈ S, if τ is consistent,
The proof of this lemma relies on the fact that each weakness can be exploited by player 2 and cause a loss of at least 3 2 ǫ because strategy τ is consistent. This can not happen almost-surely since σ is both ǫ-optimal.
The next step is to prove a statement similar to Lemma IV.14, which does assume consistency of τ .
Definition IV.15. We define the event
{there is no σ-weakness after time n} as the event {∀m > n, δ σ (S 0 · · · S m ) ≤ n}..
Notice that by definition of δ σ , if there is no deviation after date n ′ then the sequence (δ σ (S 0 · · · S m )) m∈N is constant from date n ′ .
Corollary IV. 16 . Let σ be a consistent ǫ-optimal strategy, and σ the reset strategy based on it. For all strategies τ and states s ∈ S there exists n ∈ N such that Pσ ,τ s (there is a σ-weakness after date n) < 1.
Proof (Sketch):
For every strategy τ and n ∈ N define a strategy τ n , which is sure to play consistently after date n. Thanks to Lemma IV.14, the corollary holds for this strategy. Use corollary IV.10 to prove the corollary for general τ .
Finally what is left to show is that when we are playing with the reset strategy, the number of weaknesses is a.s finite. Intuitively this is necessary because on the paths with infinitely many weaknesses the strategy might not be subgame-perfect, hence the need to show that the measure on these paths is 0.
Lemma IV.17. Let σ be an ǫ-optimal strategy, andσ the reset strategy based on it. Then for all strategies τ and states s ∈ S, Pσ ,τ s (∃n, there is no σ-weakness after date n) = 1 .
E. The reset strategy is 2ǫ-subgame-perfect The first goal is to prove that the reset strategy based on some ǫ-optimal strategy is ǫ-optimal itself. Let us first define the reset strategies that reset only up to some date and prove the ǫ-optimality of them.
Let σ be some ǫ-optimal strategy, we defineσ n as the strategy that resets only up to time n ∈ N,
where m ∧ n = min{m, n}.
Lemma IV.18. Let σ be a consistent ǫ-optimal strategy, andσ the reset strategy based on it. Then for all strategies τ , states s ∈ S and all n ∈ N,
Proof (Sketch): By induction on n, and decomposing the expected payoff on the event of a weakness at date n + 1.
Having shown that the strategiesσ n are ǫ-optimal we can proceed into proving that the reset strategyσ itself is ǫ-optimal. First we need to give a link between the strategiesσ andσ n , in the form of the following lemma.
Lemma IV. 19 . Let E be an event, and σ 1 ,σ 2 two strategies for Player 1 such that for all prefixes p of an inifinite play in E, σ 1 (p) = σ 2 (p). Then for all τ and s ∈ S,
Proof: This is obvious when f is the indicator of a cylinder, and the class of functions f with this property is closed by linear combinations and simple limits.
Lemma IV.20. Let σ be a consistent ǫ-optimal strategy, and σ the reset strategy based on it, thenσ is ǫ-optimal.
Proof: Let m and M be the lower and upper bounds of the payoff function f respectively. Let L = lim n δ σ (S 0 S 1 . . . S n ) ∈ N ∪ {∞}, which is well-defined since (δ σ (S 0 S 1 . . . S n )) n∈N is pointwise increasing.
Applying Lemma IV. 18 
Since for any measurable function f , Lemma IV.19 holds, applying it to the constant function that maps to 1, gives us Having shown that the reset strategy is ǫ-optimal, using similar ideas we prove that the reset strategy is also 2ǫsubgame-perfect.
Theorem IV.21. Let σ be a consistent ǫ-optimal strategy, and σ the reset strategy based on it, thenσ is 2ǫ-subgame-perfect.
Proof (Sketch): Fix a prefix p = s 0 . . . s n ∈ S(AS) * . If p is a σ-weakness thenσ[p] =σ and sinceσ is ǫ-optimal (Lemma IV.20),σ[p] is aa fortiori ǫ-optimal. The case where p is not a σ-weakness relies on on Lemma IV.20 and the consistency ofσ.
V. GAMES WITH SHIFT-INVARIANT AND SUBMIXING PAYOFF FUNCTIONS ARE HALF-POSITONAL
In this section, we introduce the class of shift-invariant and submixing payoff functions and we prove that in every game equipped with such a payoff function, Player 1 has a deterministic and stationary strategy which is optimal.
The definition of a submixing payoff function relies on the notion of shuffle of two words. A factorization of a sequence u ∈ C ω is an infinite sequence (u n ) n∈N ∈ (C * ) N of finite sequences whose u is the concatenation i.e. such that u = u 0 u 1 u 2 · · · . A sequence w ∈ C ω is said to be a shuffle of
In other words, the submixing condition states that the payoff associated with the shuffle of two plays cannot be strictly greater than both the payoffs of these plays.
We can now state our main result.
Theorem V.2. Let f be a payoff function and G a game equipped with f . Suppose that f is shift-invariant and submixing. Then the game G has a value and player 1 has an optimal strategy which is both deterministic and stationary.
The shift-invariant and submixing properties are sufficient but not necessary to ensure the existence of a pure and stationary optimal strategy for player 1, there are counterexamples in Section VI. Necessary and sufficient conditions for positionality are known for deterministic games [24] .
However the shift-invariant and submixing conditions are general enough to recover several known results of existence of deterministic stationary optimal strategies, and to provide several new examples of games with deterministic stationary optimal strategies, as is shown in the two next sections.
A. Proof of Half-Positionality
We prove Theorem V.2. Let f : C ω → R be a shift-invariant and submixing payoff function and G a game equipped with f . For the sake of simplicity we suppose without loss of generality that the alphabet of f is C = S × A.
We prove Theorem V.2 by induction on N (G) = s (|A 1 (s)| − 1). If N (G) = 0 then in every state controlled by player 2 there is only one action available, thus player 2 has a unique strategy which is optimal, deterministic and stationary.
Let G be a game N (G) > 0 and suppose Theorem V.2 has been proved for every game G ′ such that N (G ′ ) < N (G). Since N (G) > 0 there exists a state s ∈ A 1 such that A(s) has at least two elements. Let (A 0 (s), A 1 (s)) be a partition of A(s) in two non-empty sets. Let G 0 and G 1 be the two games obtained from G by restricting actions in state s to A 0 (s) and A 1 (s) respectively. According to the induction hypothesis, both G 0 and G 1 have values, let val 0 (s) and val 1 (s) denote the values of state s in G 0 and G 1 .
To prove the existence of a deterministic stationary optimal strategy in G it is enough to prove:
Since every strategy of player 2 in G 0 and G 1 is a strategy in G as well, then val 0 (s) ≤ val(s) and val 1 (s) ≤ val(s). Moreover according to the induction hypothesis there exist deterministic stationary optimal strategies σ 0 and σ 1 in G 0 and G 1 . Suppose that (13) holds, and without loss of generality suppose minmax(G)(s) ≤ val 0 (s). Since the deterministic stationary σ 0 is optimal in G 0 , it guarantees for every τ and s ∈ S, E σ0,τ s [f ] ≥ val 0 (s) ≥ minmax(G)(s), thus σ 0 is optimal not only in the game G 0 but in the game G as well. Thus (13) is enough to prove the inductive step.
B. The projection mapping
To prove (13), we make use of two mappings
First π 0 and π 1 are defined on finite words. The mapping π 0 associates with each finite play p ∈ (SA) * in G with source s a finite play π 0 (p) in G 0 .
Intuitively, play π 0 (p) is obtained by erasing from p some of its subwords. Remember that (A 0 (s), A 1 (s)) is a partition of A(s) hence every occurrence of state s in the play p is followed by an action a which is either in A 0 (s) or in A 1 (s). To obtain π 0 (p) one erases from p two types of subwords: 1) all simple cycles on s starting with an action in A 1 (s) are deleted from p, 2) in case the last occurrence of s in p is followed by an action in A 1 (s) then the corresponding suffix is deleted from p.
Formally, π 0 and π 1 are defined as follows. Let p = s 0 a 0 s 1 a 1 · · · s n ∈ s(AS) * and i 0 < i 1 < . . . < i k = {0 ≤ i ≤ n | s i = s} the increasing sequence of dates where the play reaches s. For 0 ≤ l < k let p l the l-th factor of p defined by p l = s i l a i l · · · a i l+1 −1 and p k = s i k a i k · · · a n−1 s n . Then for j ∈ {0, 1}, π j (p) = 0≤l≤k|ai l ∈Aj p l
We extend π 0 and π 1 to infinite words in a natural way: for an infinite play p ∈ s(AS) ω then π 0 (p) is the limit of the sequence (π 0 (p n )) n∈N , where p n is the prefix of p of length 2n + 1. Remark that π 0 (p) may be a finite play, in case play p has an infinite suffix such that every occurrence of s is followed by an action of A 1 (s).
We make use of the four following properties of π 0 and π 1 . For every infinite play p ∈ (SA) ω , (A) if π 0 (p) is finite then p has a suffix which is an infinite play in G 1 starting in s, (B) if π 1 (p) is finite then p has a suffix which is an infinite play in G 0 starting in s, (C) if both π 0 (p) and π 1 (p) are infinite then both π 0 (p) and π 1 (p) reach state s infinitely often, (D) if both π 0 (p) and π 1 (p) are infinite, then p is a shuffle of π 0 (p) and π 1 (p).
We use the three following random variables:
(18)
C. The trigger strategy
We build a strategy τ ♯ for player 2 called the trigger strategy. According to Theorem IV.1, there exists ǫ-subgame-perfect strategies τ ♯ 0 and τ ♯ 1 in the games G 0 and G 1 respectively. The strategy τ ♯ is a combination of τ ♯ 0 and τ ♯ 1 . Intuitively the strategy τ ♯ switches between τ ♯ 0 and τ ♯ 1 depending on the action chosen at the last visit in s. Let p be a finite play in s(AS) * and last(p) ∈ A the action played after the last visit of p to s and t the last state of p, then:
We are going to prove that the trigger strategy τ ♯ is ǫoptimal for player 2, thanks to three following key properties. For every strategy σ for player 1 ,
D. Proof of inequalities (19) and (20) To prove inequality (19) , we introduce the probability measure µ 1 on plays in G 1 defined as:
and the strategy σ ′ 1 for player 1 in G 1 defined for every play h controlled by player 1 by:
where denotes the prefix relation over words of S ∞ :
and ≺ the strict prefix relation. We abuse the notation and denote h and ha for the events h(AS) ω and ha(SA) ω , so that
The probability measure µ 1 has the following key properties. For every finite play h in the game G 1 whose finite state is t,
µ 1 (has | ha) = p(s|t, a).
As a consequence of the equalities (22) and (23), and according to the characterisation given by (1) and (2) the probability measure µ 1 coincides with the probability measure P (19) . The proof of (20) is symmetrical.
E. Proof of inequality (21)
The proof of (21) requires several steps. First, we prove that for every strategy σ in G, there exists a strategy σ 0 in G 0 such that for every measurable event E ⊆ (SA) ω in G 0 ,
The strategy σ 0 in G 0 is defined for every finite play controlled by player 1 by:
(h ≺ Π 0 ) > 0 and otherwise σ 0 (h) is chosen arbitrarily. We prove that (24) holds. Let E be the set of measurable events E ⊆ (SA) ω in G 0 such that (24) is satisfied. First, E contains all cylinders h 0 (SA) ω of G 0 with h 0 ∈ (SA) * because:
where the first inequality can be proved by induction on the size of h 0 , using the definition of σ 0 and where the second inequality is by definition of . Clearly E is stable by finite disjoint unions hence E contains all finite disjoint unions of cylinders, which form a boolean algebra. Moreover E is clearly a monotone class, hence according to the Monotone Class Theorem, E contains the σ-field generated by cylinders, that is all measurable events E in G 0 . This completes the proof of (24) .
Second step to obtain (21) is to prove that for every strategy σ 0 in G 0 : (25). Now we come to the end of the proof of (21) . Let σ 0 be a strategy in G 0 such that (24) holds for every measurable event E in G 0 . According to (25) , P σ0,τ ♯ s (f > val 0 (s) + ǫ and s is reached infinitely often) = 0. For i ∈ {0, 1} denote E i and F i the events: E i = {Π i is infinite and reaches s infinitely often}, (26)
Remark that F i is well-defined since condition E i implies that Π i is infinite thus f (Π i ) is well-defined in (27) . According to (25) Together with (D) and because f is submixing this implies P σ,τ ♯ s (f ≤ max{val 0 (s), val 1 (s)} + ǫ | E 0 and E 1 ) = 1 and according to (C) this terminates the proof of (21).
Since equations (19) , (20) and (21) hold for every strategy σ and every ǫ, minmax(s) ≤ max{val 0 (s), val 1 (s)}. W.l.o.g. assume minmax(s) ≤ val 0 (s). Then the stationary deterministic strategy σ 0 optimal in G 0 is a strategy in G as well and σ 0 ensures an expected income of val 0 (s) thus minmax(s) ≤ val 0 (s) ≤ maxmin(s). As a consequence, the state s has value val 0 (s) in the game G and σ 0 is optimal in G. This completes the proof of Theorem V.2.
Note that the proof of Theorem V.2 does not rely on Martin's theorem.
VI. APPLICATIONS
A. Unification of classical results
The existence of deterministic stationary optimal strategies in Markov decision processes with parity [7] , limsup, liminf [19] , mean-payoff [6] , [4] , [3] , [25] or discounted payoff functions [1] is well-known. Theorem V.2 provides a unified proof of these five results, as a corollary of the following proposition.
Proposition VI.1. The payoff functions f lsup , f linf , f par and f mean are shift-invariant and submixing.
This was proved in [11] , [26] .
Corollary VI.2. In every two-player stochastic game equipped with the parity, limsup, liminf, mean or discounted payoff function, both players have a deterministic and stationary strategy which is optimal.
Proof: Except for the discounted payoff function, this is a direct consequence of Proposition VI.1 and Theorem V.2. The case of the discounted payoff function can be reduced to the case of the mean-payoff function, interpreting discount factors as stopping probabilities as was done in the seminal paper of Shapley [1] . Deshift-invariants follow. Every Markov decision process G with states S equipped with a discounted payoff function can be turned into a Markov decision process G ′ with states S ∪ S × {0} equipped with a mean-payoff function such that for every strategy σ ′ optimal in G ′ its restriction σ to S is optimal in G. States of G ′ are obtained by adding an extra absorbing state (s, 0) for each state s ∈ S, the reward in state (s, 0) is r(s) 1−λ(s) . Whatever action is chosen in state s there is probability 1 − λ(s) to go to the absorbing state (s, 0) and stay there forever, whereas the original transition probabilities in G to states s ∈ S are multiplied by λ(s).
Corollary VI.2 unifies and simplifies existing proofs of [7] for the parity game and [19] for the limsup game.
The existence of determinstic and stationary optimal strategies in mean-payoff games has attracted many attention. The first proof was given by Gilette [5] and based on a variant of Hardy and Littlewood theorem. Later on, Ligget and Lippman found the variant to be wrong and proposed an alternative proof based on the existence of Blackwell optimal strategies plus a uniform boundedness result of Brown [6] . Actually a careful inspection of their proof shows that it contains a flaw as well: first, it is not clear at all how to deduce (7) from (6) and (5) on line 20 of page 606 of [6] , second there is no obvious reason for the hypotheses of Brown's result [27, Theorem 4.2] to be satisfied in the context of [6] . For one-player games, Bierth [3] gave a proof using martingales and elementary linear algebra while [25] provided a proof based on linear programming and a modern proof can be found in [4] based on a reduction to discounted games and the use analytical tools. For tw-player games, a correct proof of positionality of two-player mean-payoff games with perfect information can be found in [26] , [28] .
B. Variants of mean-payoff games
The positive average condition defined by (9) is a variant of mean-payoff games which may be more suitable to model quality of service constraints or decision makers with a loss aversion.
Albeit function f posavg is very similar to the f mean function, maximizing the expected value of f posavg and f mean are two distinct goals. For example, a positive average maximizer prefers seeing the sequence 1, 1, 1, . . . for sure rather than seeing with equal probability 1 2 the sequences 0, 0, 0, . . . or 10, 10, 10, . . . while a mean-value maximizer prefers the second situation to the first one.
To the best knowledge of the author, the techniques used in [3] , [4] , [25] cannot be used to prove positionality of these games.
Since the positive average condition is the composition of the submixing function f mean with an increasing function it is submixing as well, hence it is half-positional.
In mean-payoff co-Bchi games, a subset of the states are called Bchi states, and the payoff of player 1 is −∞ if Bchi states are visited infinitely often and the mean-payoff value of the rewards otherwise. It is easy to check that such a payoff mapping is shift-invariant and submixing. Notice that in the present paper we do not explicitely handle payoff mappings that take infinite values, but it is possible to approximate the payoff function by replacing −∞ by arbitrary small values to prove half-positionality of mean-payoff co-Bchi games.
C. New examples of positional payoff function
Although the generalized mean-payoff condition defined by (10) is not submixing a variant is. Optimistic generalized mean-payoff games are defined similarly except the winning condition is ∃i, f i mean ≥ 0.
It is a basic exercise to show that this winning condition is submixing. More generally, if f 1 , . . . , f n are submixing payoff mappings then max{f 1 , . . . , f n } is submixing as well.
Remark that optimistic generalized mean-payoff games are half-positional but not positional, this is a simple exercise. Another examples are provided in [11] , [13] , [26] .
CONCLUSION
We would like to be able to generalize the submising condition in order to cover all positional counter-games presented in [10] . Although [12] provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the positionality of one-player games, it seems not obvious how this characterization can be used to prove positionality of counter games. For every k ∈ N let Y k = X min(T,k) . The stopped process (Y k ) k∈N is also a martingale, a basic property of martingales. Since (X n ) n∈N is bounded by K, (Y n ) n∈N also is and according to LemmaII.9 it converges almost-surely. By definition of X T the limit of (Y n ) n∈N is X T . By definition of martingales, for every n ∈ N, In case every action is value-neutral, we have nothing to prove. Assume that there exists an action a ∈ A(s) which is not value neutral. Let s ′ ∈ S be such that p(s, a, s ′ ) > 0 and val(s) = val(s ′ ). Denote the event "we see action a infinitely often" by E sa , formally
The goal is to prove that for all consistent strategies σ, t ∈ S and τ we have P σ,τ t (E sa ) = 0. Assume on the contrary that for some consistent σ, t ∈ S and τ we have P σ,τ t (E sa ) > 0. This implies that also P σ,τ
And this in turn implies that when playing with σ, τ and starting from state t, there is some non-zero probability that for infinitely many n ∈ N,
Clearly a consequence of (28) is that there is some non-zero probability that the sequence val(S 0 ), val(S 1 ), . . . does not converge. But according to Lemma II.9, the submartingale val(S 0 ), val(S 1 ), . . . converges almost surely, hence for all consistent strategies σ all t ∈ S and τ we have P σ,τ t (E sa ) = 0.
PROOF OF LEMMA IV.11
Let G ′ be the game identical to G except that a ∈ A(s) (action a is removed). For all t ∈ S it is immediate that val(G)(t) ≥ val(G ′ )(t) since Player 1 has one more action to choose from in the game G, while Player 2 has the same number of actions to choose from. Hence our goal is to prove the following:
We split the proof of (29) in two cases, for t = s and t = s.
and τ the strategy for Player 2 in G that plays according to strategy τ ′ which is ǫ-optimal in G ′ , as long as Player 1 does not choose the suboptimal action a. In case he does choose it, τ switches definitely to the strategy τ ′′ that is d 2 -optimal in G. Let Opt be the event (∀n ∈ N, S n = s =⇒ A n+1 = a), that is the event that Player 1 never chooses the suboptimal action a. When playing with the strategy τ we have the following properties, for all t and σ:
To show (30), note because of the condition Opt the game is played only in G ′ , hence the strategy σ even though it is a strategy in G it behaves like the strategy σ ′ in G ′ defined in the following way: for all p = s 0 . . . s n ∈ S(AS) * , and b ∈ A(s n ),
, because τ never has to switch to τ ′′ . Now (30) is a direct consequence of the ǫ-optimality of τ ′ .
As a subsequence of the strategy τ ′ namely that it resets to the strategy τ ′′ if a weakness occurs, by shifting up to the first weakness we get:
the inequality is a subsequence of the strategy τ ′ that takes advantage of the weakness by definition. Plugging this inequality on (33):
where in the equality we have decomposed
, and the second inequality is a consequence of the following: F is a stopping time, and (val(S n )) n∈N is a martingale because player 2 is playing consistently, thus applying Corollary IV. 13 we get E σ,τ ′ s [val(S F )] ≤ val(s). Finally from above: Let σ be a consistent ǫ-optimal strategy, andσ the reset strategy based on it. Then there exists µ > 0 such that for all τ and s ∈ S and n ∈ N there exists n ′ > n such that,
where τ n is the strategy defined in Definition A.1.
Proof:
For every n ∈ N, define F n = min{m > n | δ σ (S 0 . . . S m ) = m} and min ∅ = ∞, the date of the first weakness strictly after n, and F 2 n = F Fn the date of the second weakness strictly after n. We prove that there exists µ > 0 such that for all n ∈ N, strategy τ , and state s ∈ S,
Let µ be given by Lemma IV.14 and weak defined like in the proof of Lemma IV.14. Then (34) is a consequence of:
where the first and second equalities hold because
the third equality because if weak(n, p) thenσ[p] =σ, the fouth equality is a consequence of Lemma IV.19 since σ andσ coincide up to the first σ-weakness and the last inequality holds because according to the definition of τ n , and since |p| ≥ n then τ n [p] is consistent and we can apply Lemma IV.14.
Let n ′ ≥ n such that Pσ ,τn
which exists because by definition of F 2 n ,
Then
where the first inequality is by choice of n ′ , the equality in (35) is because P(F 2 n < ∞ | F n = ∞) = 0, and the inequality is from (34). This completes the proof. PROOF OF COROLLARY IV. 16 We use Definition A.1.
Let Ω be the RV taking values in N ∪ {∞} that maps to the date of the last suboptimal action played, if it exists, otherwise let it be ∞. Because τ and τ n coincide on all paths where the last suboptimal action is played before n, that is on the event {Ω < n}, then for any n ∈ N and event E: Sinceσ is consistent we can apply Corollary IV.10, we have lim n Pσ ,τ s (Ω < n) = 1, therefore Let µ > 0 be the uniform bound in accord with Lemma A.2, and fix n ∈ N such that for all events E we have |Pσ ,τ s (E) − Pσ ,τn s (E)| < µ. For some n ′ > n take E to be the event {there is a weakness after date n ′ }, and apply Lemma A.2 to conclude the proof. PROOF OF LEMMA IV.17
Let L = lim n δ σ (S 0 S 1 . . . S n ) ∈ N ∪ {∞}, which is well-defined since (δ σ (S 0 S 1 . . . S n )) n∈N is pointwise increasing. Fix ǫ ′ > 0, and choose τ and s such that:
Let n ∈ N be such that according to Corollary IV.16 µ = Pσ ,τ s (F n < ∞) < 1. Then we have the following: Pσ ≤ Eσ ,τ s [1 Fn<∞ · (Pσ ,τ s (L = ∞) + ǫ ′ )] = µ(Pσ ,τ s (L = ∞) + ǫ ′ ) First equality is a basic property of conditional expectations, the second one is a consequence of Pσ ,τ s (F n < ∞ | L = ∞) = 1, the third one is from the definition of the reset strategyσ, the inequality is because of (36). Hence, because µ < 1 we have Pσ ,τ s (L = ∞) ≤ µ 1−µ ǫ ′ . And finally for all s ′′ ∈ S and τ ′′ we have
Since this holds for any ǫ ′ > 0, we get Pσ ,τ s (L = ∞) = 0. PROOF OF LEMMA IV.18
We proceed by induction on n, the base case being true by definition sinceσ 0 = σ, and the induction hypothesis being that for all τ and s ∈ S, Eσ n ,τ s [f ] ≥ val(s) − ǫ. We have to show that the same holds when Player 1 plays with the strategyσ n+1 . Fix a strategy τ and a state s. Let τ ′ be the strategy that plays like τ except if there is a weakness at date n + 1 (in case of the event δ σ (S 0 . . . S n+1 ) = n + 1) in which case it resets to the ǫ 2 -optimal response τ ′′ . Let L n = δ σ (S 0 . . . S n ) By decomposing the expected values on the only event that matters, namely the event of a weakness at the date n + 1, let R be the set of all prefixes of length n + 1 where a weakness occurs, that is R = {s 0 . . . s n+1 ∈ S(AS) * | δ σ,ǫ (s 0 . . . s n+1 ) = n + 1}.
Then where the secodn equality is by construction of τ ′ and the inequality because τ ′′ is chosen as the ǫ 2 -optimal to σ[s 0 . . . s n+1 ], which is not 2ǫ-optimal by definitino of R.
sets of finite continuations of s 0 . . . s n with a weakness, for both strategiesσ 1 and σ 2 respectively. Then for the last two terms we have: in the probabilities of the cylinders t 0 . . . t m we can freely interchange the pairs of strategiesσ 1 , σ 2 and τ, τ ′ , since they coincide up to the first weakness. Therefore we get that
, which is the promised contradiction of (37) when plugging into (38)
